Introduction

Liberalization of environmental goods that are climate-friendly could aid climate mitigation efforts by lowering costs of these goods by reducing or eliminating higher tariffs and nontariff barriers (NTBs). But, as WTO negotiations to selectively accelerate liberalization of these goods, the exercise is fraught with a number of challenges, a major one being that there is no universally accepted definition of environmental goods that exist. A number of environmental goods both intrinsically as well as the way they are classified for customs purposes have 'dual' i.e. both environmental and non-environmental uses. Further, most of the major producers and exporters of these technologies and products are developed and the larger, middleincome developing countries. Therefore, unless products such as bio-fuels or lower-technology components are deemed to be 'environmental goods' many smaller income developing countries may see little export benefits from liberalization. On the other hand potential does exist for a number of smaller developing countries to specialize in parts and components lower down the value-chain of certain climate-friendly technologies and such opportunities need to be explored further. Another major conclusion of the research has been that supportive Government policies and public and private financing are a key market driver particularly in the area of renewable energy. Thus, for many smaller developing countries, bilateral and multilateral technical and financial assistance both as part of a trade-liberalization package (within or outside the WTO) as well as in other relevant forums such as the UNFCCC will be critical in enabling them to emerge as attractive markets for climate-friendly technologies as well as enable them to build and develop capacity at higher levels of the value chain.
The Stern Review has highlighted the potential contribution trade liberalization in clean technologies could make to climate change mitigation. Such trade liberalization could contribute positively towards moving economies onto "low-carbon" trajectories to the extent that it drives diffusion and access to low-carbon and energyefficient technologies as well as to renewable sources of energy.
Trade is an important channel for the diffusion of many climate mitigation technologies and goods. Few countries have the domestic capacities or know-how to produce all that they need. This is particularly true for many developing and least-developed countries, This information note will survey the key issues surrounding liberalized trade in climate-friendly goods. The focus will be on goods relevant to climatemitigation rather than those relevant for adaptation. While it is well-known that for many developing countries, adaptation is a higher priority rather than undertaking mitigation measures, the fact is that adaptation goods and technologies are diverse and diffuse and often involve low-tech local solutions and materials. This also makes it much harder to pin them down in terms of their position within WTO and other trade liberalisation efforts. Since the WTO is the only trade negotiating forum with a specific EGS mandate at present, this section will survey the key negotiating issues and challenges that have arisen in the WTO context, although more work is clearly needed to assess the prospects for pursuing opportunities within other fora, such as regional and bilateral trade agreements. The focus will be on goods, as negotiations have been more active in this area-although climate-related services also are key from a mitigation perspective.
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Defining and classifying climate-friendly goods. The lack of a universally accepted definition of environmental goods has slowed down agreement on product coverage in negotiations on environmental goods. Two broad categories of EGs have featured in the WTO discussions so far: traditional environmental goods, with the main purpose of addressing or remedying an environmental problem (e.g., carbon capture and storage technologies); and environmentally preferable products (EPPs), which include any product with certain environmental benefits arising either during the production, use or disposal stage relative to a substitute or "like" product. Figure 1 below provides some examples of products from both categories.
Introducing an additional layer of complexity, products can be environmentally preferable, either due to improvements in embedded technology (e.g., more energy-efficient variants of the same good, such as a car) or as compared to a different product (such as solar cookers versus wood-burning stoves).
In terms of classification, categories and subcategories of goods are assigned a code within the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), allowing countries to track trade volumes and tariff levels. The more digits are included in a code, the more specific the description of the good is. At the WTO, countries have HS numbers for products only up to the six-digit level. Beyond that, as product descriptions get more specific, different members use different codes and descriptions. This makes it difficult to clearly identify EGs, including climate mitigation goods, at the six-digit level. They are often lumped together with other goods that are unrelated to the environment or climate mitigation. For example one list of proposed products contains HS-8413.81: "pumps for liquids, whether or not fitted with a measuring device; other pumps". Such pumps are often used by wind turbines for energy storage. But at the six-digit level of generality it is impossible to separate those pumps used in this manner from pumps used in any number of other applications. While it is possible to identify and liberalize specific goods using "ex-outs" beyond the HS-6 digit level, Members need to agree on product codes, or at least product descriptions in the area of climate mitigation, which can be a time-consuming process.
"Processes and production methods (PPMs)," relativity and evolving technology. Most WTO Members have not accorded "environmental goods" status to otherwise "like" products that have been produced using methods friendlier to the environment. This is due to the difficulty of distinguishing such products within the HS system and challenges of harmonizing standards and labelling, as well as to systemic concerns with regard to other non-product-related standards making their way into the WTO system as a basis for differentiated treatment. Even for products where the environmental benefits do not depend on PPMs, many are only relatively eco-friendly. Hybrid cars, which can be compared to electric cars, provide one example. Moreover, technological change could make existing "relatively friendly" EGs obsolete tomorrow. How should trade negotiations respond to these challenges? Once lowered and bound, tariffs cannot be raised again for obsolete products. At the very least, newer products that emerge should automatically benefit from trade benefits accorded to the obsolete one. If relatively clean goods are accorded preferences, should we distinguish based on national-level baselines, or some internationally set baseline? Predominant methods of production differ dramatically across countries. Some experts, including Mytelka (2007) , argue that only truly "clean" technologies should benefit from EG liberalizationas opposed to "relatively cleaner" products, but then we are left with the challenge of defining truly clean-particularly challenging as one takes a longerterm perspective.
The dual-use problem. The dual use problem is one of most important challenges facing EG negotiators. It arises from the fact that most product categories proposed by WTO Members as EGs for rapid liberalization include, at the HS-6 digit level, other products that also have non-environmental uses.
In other cases, a specific ex-out product, such as a pipe, may intrinsically be dual-use and used for environmental and non-environmental purposes. Pipes, for instance, are used as components of sewage treatment plants as well as for transporting oil and gas. The two types of dual-use products in terms are illustrated below.
Most developing countries are hesitant to liberalize bound tariffs on dual-use products such as valves and pumps due to concerns about the impact of such overarching liberalization on their established domestic industries. Proponents of these liberalization efforts argue that the environmental benefits would be limited if liberalization was confined only to a handful of products used solely for environmental purposes. For a number of developing and leastdeveloped countries in particular, the tariff revenue gains from many of these products may be important and this needs to be taken into account.
The distribution question. A big challenge for the EG negotiations is to include products of export interest to developing countries. The perception so far has been that EGs-being capital-and technology-intensive-are of export interest only to developed countries and a few middle-income 
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Used in Solar Hot Water Systems Other cross-cutting issues: that have been raised during EG discussions include the need to identify and deal with non-tariff measures and ensure special and differential treatment (S&DT) for developing countries. Various S&DT proposals-such as multiple product lists with different rates of tariff reduction, sensitive product exemptions and longer implementation periods-have been made by various WTO Members.
As a Non-Environmental Good
Climate-relevant proposals: From a climate mitigation perspective, the EG negotiations have seen proposals from Qatar, the "Friends," and, more recently, from the United States and EU, which have included "climate-friendly" goods. Early on in the negotiations, Qatar proposed liberalizing natural gas fired generation systems and advanced gas generation systems, citing a reference to its benefits under the UNFCCC. Qatar also referred to the IPCC Assessment Reports, which recommended increased use of natural gas over other fossil fuels as a way to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The "Friends" proposed a list of 153 products, which included categories such as renewable energy products, solid waste management, and heat and energy management products. On 30 November 2007, the United States and EU proposed accelerated liberalization of goods and services relevant to climate change mitigation, including zero tariffs by 2013 for 43 products that were identified by the World Bank from the "Friends" 153 list as being relevant to climate change mitigation. There were to be longer phase-in periods for liberalization by developing countries and participation was made optional for least developed countries. The list of 43 goods included a wide variety of products such as solar collectors and system controllers, wind-turbine parts and components, stoves, grates and cookers and hydrogen fuel cells. The list was supposed to be a starting point for discussions rather than an exhaustive one. The United States and EU further suggested the negotiation of an innovative Environmental Goods and Services Agreement modelled on the existing WTO Information Technology Agreement (ITA) that would include other, nonclimate related EGs as well. Relevant climate mitigation services such as engineering, maintenance and technical testing were also covered.
Despite the United States pointing out that it was a net importer of these 43 goods and that developing countries such as China, Mexico, Malaysia, Chinese Taipei and Indonesia were among the top exporters, many developing countries questioned the "development dimension" of the proposed list. Brazil criticized the exclusion of ethanol from the list. Many developing countries were concerned that the "climate goods" list, as with most other environmental goods proposed in the WTO, included dual-use products.
This information note has identified some of the key issues and challenges pertaining to environmental goods negotiations that also affect liberalization efforts for climate mitigation goods. (2008) is revealing. Jha clearly shows that demand for these products may be determined by factors other than tariffs such as gross domestic product (GDP), foreign direct investment, enforcement of environmental regulations (shown by environmental performance indices) and the number of bilaterally funded "environmental" projects. For instance, many African countries already have very low tariffs on many environmental goods, but little or no imports because their GDPs are constrained and they have other import priorities. Trade liberalization with a lack of purchasing power will certainly not help. In addition, according to Jha (2008) , technical assistance or tied aid projects also appear to be directed to those countries which have the relevant purchasing power. This gap in EG imports in a large number of developing countries also points to the need for technical assistance projects in developing countries, especially in Africa. Bilateral and multilateral donor assistance in this regard has focused especially on the relatively high income developing countries, notably China, the Republic of Korea, Brazil or Mexico.
Further, while categories within the '153' list that are relevant to climate change mitigation, such as renewable energy and heat and energy management appear sensitive to tariffs, long-term dynamic comparative advantage (until 2015) in these products lie with developed countries (for renewable energy) and with middle-income developing countries (for heat and energy management products). It is thus important to ensure that benefits from trade liberalization also accrue to the poorer developing countries that may either lack resources to import such products or the capacity to produce, operate and deploy them.
Intellectual property rights may also act as a barrier to access, particularly in emerging climate technologies. Trade liberalization alone may not result in "take-off' of a technology in developing countries if costs are kept high due to high licensing fees or royalty payments. For a more in-depth discussion on this set of issues, see the background paper in With regard to trade liberalization, it is by no means certain that the Doha Round of negotiations will achieve what may be a desired level of trade liberalization with appropriate provisions that respond to the totality of developed and developing country interests. This is due to the complex political economy dynamics that will influence an eventual outcome, including progress in critical areas of the Doha negotiations, such as agricultural and industrial market access, concerns about impacts of liberalization on domestic industries and tariff revenues, as well as the inclusion (or lack thereof) of products of developing country export interestsincluding agricultural products.
This raises the issue of alternatives where liberalization initiatives for climate mitigation goods and services may be pursued. Within the WTO,
Additional Opportunities for Liberalization of Low-Carbon Goods
Members might wish to consider initiatives similar to the ITA, which was open to voluntary participationbut concessions were extended on a most favoured nation basis to all WTO Members. The agreement could come into effect when a certain number of Members, constituting a minimum percentage of trade in these products and services, joined. Such an agreement could lie within the WTO Framework and could be tied to the timeline for conclusion of Doha Round talks. Another option is a plurilateral agreement similar to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, which members could opt to join or to stay outside of. The trade concessions would extend only to participating Members. Such an agreement could also eventually be made multilateral (with benefits extending to the entire membership) once a minimum number of countries, constituting a certain percentage of trade in these products and services, joined.
Both options would, however, still need to deal with the challenges that apply to the Doha EGS negotiationsparticularly in terms of product classification. Another possibility would be to pursue liberalization of "climate mitigation" goods and services through regional trading agreements or bilateral free trade agreements. In such cases there usually is no need for a separate EGS mandate, as the objective is to liberalize "substantially all trade"-although it may be possible to single out certain EGS for earlier liberalization. Because of the greater ambition of liberalization in regional trading agreements, dual-use of environmental goods may be less of a concern as compared to the situation in WTO EGS negotiations.
Whatever the forum for liberalization, it will be important to include it within a broader package consisting of complementary initiatives such as special and differential treatment and technical and financial assistance. Only then will liberalisation efforts on environmental goods gain credence with most smaller developing countries. The impact of trade liberalization for climate change mitigation efforts, as with most other sustainable development objectives, will be only be as effective as the broader enabling framework within which it is put into play.
